Plausible Deniability: Russia’s Modern International Strategy
Alastair Munro, Print Staff Writer
July 22, 2020
Russian troops in Syrian air base
To say that the situation in Libya is not quite as NATO had hoped following Operation Unified Protector would be an understatement. The internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) is barely clinging to a thread of sovereignty, local militias control large swathes of the country, and the insurgent House of Representatives (HoR), led by General Haftar, aims to establish a government. The humanitarian impact of the conflict has been dire, critically disrupting the country’s already weak infrastructure, with water, healthcare, and education becoming endangered for most. In light of this, it’s not surprising that the global powers of the world have reaffirmed their commitment to non-interference, and a strict arms embargo has been imposed by the United Nations. Earlier this year, the leaders of Russia, Germany, Turkey, and others all publicly stated that they would not involve themselves in the conflict, and stressed the criticality of a peaceful compromise between the GNA and HoR, who are the two main players in the arena. This is to be expected. Despite criticisms of the UN’s enforcement, openly flaunting international sanctions is rarely an advisable strategy. Therefore, action taken to influence the war’s outcome has generally been far more underhanded, such as Turkey’s alleged funneling of Syrian Civil War veterans to assist with the GNA’s military engagements. However, reports from the United Nations and in-state actors in Libya indicate that something far less covert is occurring on the battlefields south of Tripoli: Russian nationals with military equipment and training directly engaging with enemy combatants, and even allegedly conducting chemical warfare against GNA forces.
These Russian nationals are not an official detachment of the Russian Armed Forces, at least according to the Kremlin. Rather, they belong to one of the most prolific and active Private Military Security Contractors (PMSCs) on the global stage today: the Wagner Group. Recently, they have appeared in various areas in which Russia has a geopolitical interest. In particular, their actions in the Ukraine, in which they assisted with the invasion of Crimea and then aided pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, cemented them as a major military force. This was further corroborated by their involvement in the Syrian Civil War fighting alongside the forces of Bashar al-Asad, leading them into direct conflict with American troops stationed there. This omnipresence in strategically important areas of Russian interest may explain why it is that there has been no real, committed crackdown on them, despite PMSCs being technically illegal under Russian law. Alternatively, as much evidence suggests, this unique interest the Wagner Group has with protecting Russian interests in areas where direct, official military intervention would be impractical is not the result of a great patriotism within the company. Rather, a far more explicit relationship between the Kremlin and Wagner (along with other PMSCs) is distinctly suggested by several observers. Specifically, Wagner’s purported head, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is a known associate of Putin’s, the group seems to be primarily assembled of former military and special operations personnel from Russia’s official agencies, and members have allegedly been trained at official Russian Forces bases. In light of this, it does appear that Russia has been covertly assisting and abetting Wagner, although the degree of influence the Kremlin has over their actions is not entirely clear.
The advantages of using, or allowing, a PMSC to handle military situations in geopolitically sensitive areas is clear, given Russia’s foreign convictions and position on the world stage. Russia still perceives its major strength as being hard power, with the Kremlin often seeking to exert influence through military means as opposed to diplomacy. However, this has its drawbacks. Although Russia has not been crippled by the backlash to its Crimean actions, it is likely trying to avoid a repeat of the consequences it suffered: ostracisation and sanctions. Therefore, being able to direct a force of unaccountable mercenaries to engage in areas where they seek an influence, yet cannot internationally defend direct involvement, is an invaluable capability in Putin’s foreign affairs arsenal, given the plausible deniability they provide. Particularly, it allows Russia to defend its interests even in areas and operations that would otherwise be a diplomatic minefield - direct conflict between Russian and American infantry leading to many casualties, for example, would have been a bombshell in relations between the countries. Yet, when this very situation unfolded in Syria, the Russian ministry of defense was able to claim no knowledge of the Russians who died in an American attack, saying that they were merely citizens acting outside the Kremlin’s control. And today, in Libya, Russia seeks to be both the impartial mediator between the GNA and HoR, yet also assist the HoR in its conquest of the country. The Wagner Group presents them with an appealing opportunity to eat their cake and have it too.
One thing is clear: the involvement of foreign nationals, quite possibly trained, funded, and even directed by a foreign government is doing no favours to the stability of Libya. General Haftar, although marginally the underdog, is less likely to seek a truce with the government given that he has the advantage of a large number of highly-trained specialists, especially ones who allegedly aren’t afraid of extreme tactics in the pursuit of victory: according to GNA officials, their soldiers have been the target of chemical attacks by Wagner on the battlefield, with nerve gas being used to paralyse them before snipers deliver the coup de grace. Similarly, the GNA is unlikely to take appeals for a ceasefire seriously when they come from a country known to be aiding troops in the fight against them. Though the future of Wagner in Libya is currently uncertain, with some sources indicating their evacuation from the country, there’s no doubt that what they have already done has strained the peace efforts pursued by world leaders and the UN.
Further, the possibility that Wagner is Kremlin-directed opens up a troubling new paradigm in Russia’s foreign affairs. The usage of nominally non-state actors to pursue foreign policy objectives is not a recent phenomena in Russian strategy, nor global affairs; nevertheless, the plausible deniability and freedom of operations afforded by utilising and directing mercenary groups presents yet another challenge in holding state actors such as Russia accountable for their actions on the international stage, and for promoting stability in areas of conflict. And, given the efficiency Russia has found in this tactic, it’s unlikely to go away any time soon. Unless Russia is internationally penalised for this, or finds it more worthwhile to simply engage in conventional warfare when needed, there is little to suggest that the Wagner Group and its ilk will be disbanded in the near future. Therefore, the destabilising influence of heavily armed, well trained Russians on crucial battlefields around the world will likely persist. Certainly, its effect in the Libyan Civil War will be felt for some time.